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Roula Khalaf, Editor of the FT, selects her favourite stories in this weekly newsletter.
The writer is a former security minister and a Conservative MP
We can’t say we haven’t been warned. Since last Christmas, a Russian-linked crude carrier has been accused of severing cables linking Finland and Estonia, a Russian spy ship has been spotted off Britain’s coast, and the cables connecting Ireland to the world have proved very interesting to Moscow’s fleet. Every connection that binds us together has attracted the interest of those trying to tear us apart.
Europe’s front line is no longer just the muddy trenches of the Donbas, but the exposed waters of the North and Baltic Seas. Fleets of decaying, uninsured vessels move sanctioned oil through our waters, while others of opaque ownership loiter suspiciously over data cables and pipelines. The combination of environmental risk and sabotage is a new way of war; we just lack the honesty to call it out.
Russia’s violence in Ukraine, violation of environmental and security norms, and subversion of European society demand a response, but reliance on the US has left us looking only through the military lens of Nato. We need to re-examine the rules that would allow us to remove unsafe ships. And to prepare ourselves so that we can prioritise more than self-protection; we could sever the revenue streams that fund Vladimir Putin’s war machine.
Under Articles 19 and 25 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states have the right to intervene when passage through territorial waters threatens security. Article 220 permits the boarding and detention of vessels posing serious pollution risks.
We need a change of attitude in Whitehall. The new Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board, chaired by the Cabinet Office, looks likely to be just another talking shop. What we need is a minister responsible for the UK’s extended maritime interest, as the Admiralty once was. That — and dropping the belief that international law only applies to us in a form of masochistic decolonisation as the recent decision to hand over the Chagos Islands shows — would see a transformation in our approach to vital waters around us. It would remind us why the rules were written in the first place: to defend our freedoms.
When combined with Britain’s sanctions and the established powers of maritime states, we have a powerful legal armoury to get these sanction-busting rustbuckets out of our waters. But only if we’re willing to enforce the rules: authority is nothing without capability. You cannot inspect a hull or chase a shadow tanker armed just with a writ. You need ships, in the right numbers, at the right speed.
The UK, Ireland and the Nordic and Baltic states all face the same threat in the same waters but for too long we have treated naval procurement as a series of national job-creation schemes — leaving us both poorer and weaker.
Instead of designing and building different, expensive frigates, these nations should adopt a common fleet. The lower costs, faster production and easier repairs in each other’s ports would increase operational tempo, reach and endurance.
Poland has already grasped this logic. The Arrowhead 140 frigate will be their platform for drones, sensors and more. In Britain the same vessel will be the Royal Navy’s Type 31, allowing cross support and procurement of add-ons. Warsaw is also buying Swedish Blekinge submarines, creating trusted supply chains and opening the possibility of crewing across borders. Nato’s Joint Expeditionary Force already includes other Baltic Sea nations who, if they co-ordinated equipment, could turn passive observation into active disruption.
The UK’s role in leading the JEF could see us as architects of a new northern maritime compact. Common patrol vessels and undersea infrastructure protection would demonstrate that Europe is capable of securing its own neighbourhood without defaulting to the US.
This signal is vital for Washington. Undersea cables and offshore energy are not just commercial assets; they are the spine of western economic and military power. Protecting them is a core Nato responsibility and effective policing would reassure the US that we can uphold our part of the bargain without constantly running to them.
We don’t need new institutions or even new ideas. The cities of the Hanseatic League once co-operated to blockade the Republic of Novgorod, understanding that trade relies on the vigorous defence of the rules that make it possible. We need that same commitment across northern capitals to understand that maritime security is an endurance effort.
After a year of escalation, the question is not what we may lose but what we’re prepared to defend.