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The writer is senior counsellor at Centerview Partners, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former US diplomat
Regime change tends to happen in one of two ways. A country is defeated in war, and the victor follows up with nation-building — often involving an occupation that seeks to impose a new political system and leadership on the country. This is what took place after the second world war in both Japan and Germany, in Afghanistan following 9/11, and in Iraq in 2003.
The second model is internal collapse, usually resulting from prolonged economic decline, military overextension, domestic repression and political stagnation. This happened in Iran in 1979 and as the Soviet Union unravelled.
What is going on in Iran today fits neither model. Yes, Iran suffered a series of serious strategic setbacks at the hands of Israel and the US in 2025, but it was never fully defeated, much less occupied. And it won’t come to be occupied, as no outside power has the will or ability to enter a country of over 90mn people and implement an alternative to the system introduced by the clerics 47 years ago.
Yes, Iran faces many severe challenges. Its currency is in free fall, inflation is high, there is a widespread water shortage, and the economy is a mess due to incompetent rule and western sanctions. A huge gap has opened between the increasingly sclerotic ruling establishment and much of Iranian society.
But Iran still produces more than 3mn barrels of oil per day and is still able to export some of it. Security forces remain capable and loyal to the regime, and the opposition (better understood as oppositions) is fragmented and weak. Two things can be true at the same time: the Iranian regime is closer to collapse now than at any time since the 1979 revolution, yet it is still not on the brink of collapsing.
Thus, it should not surprise anyone that the regime appears to have survived, after brutally putting down the uprising that began in late December, much as it did previous ones. Regime change, defined as replacement of the powers that be with something fundamentally different, is neither imminent nor inevitable. Attacking Iran militarily is unlikely to change this calculus. But the US and the west still have an interest in helping to bring about change in Iran and they can still implement policies that increase the likelihood of achieving that end: an evolutionary policy of changing the regime rather than revolutionary regime change.
Such an approach bears some resemblance to postwar attempts to deal with the Soviet Union. The initial focus was containment — frustrating Soviet efforts to expand its influence and control around the world. But a secondary goal was domestic change. It took four decades, but in the end the policy succeeded, the result of Soviet economic failure, superior western economic, political and social accomplishments, Nato cohesion, Moscow’s costly imperial venture in Afghanistan, and the emergence of a leader (Mikhail Gorbachev) who set in motion a reform process that ran out of control. So what does this suggest vis-à-vis Iran?
First, economic pressure: targeted sanctions are needed against prominent Iranian individuals and institutions, along with increased prohibitions against buying Iranian oil, seizures of tankers and sanctions against countries trading with Iran. It needs to be increased wherever possible.
Second, economic reward: the west ought to publicly articulate a readiness to reduce sanctions and assist Iran economically if it meets specified conditions, including an end to its nuclear weapons programme, support for proxies and repression of its people. This would make clear Iran’s economic crisis was a result of flawed policies and priorities, adding to pressure on the regime.
Third, containment. Diplomacy is not a favour; it is a tool. Partial deals make sense if Iran meets some of our conditions and in return gets a degree of economic relief. Interaction would also provide an opportunity to establish ties with leaders who could one day become reformers. But the US should use military force to keep Iranian capabilities — including ballistic missiles, drones and nuclear weapons aspirations — in check if negotiations fail to do so. Using both carrots and sticks is critical.
Fourth, work with the opposition. Those living abroad should be urged to communicate with insiders to develop and articulate common political, economic and foreign policy goals that would appeal to parts of the ruling establishment. They also need to develop tactics that are not based on an armed confrontation they cannot win. In the future, the west must be ready to frustrate the regime’s ability to shut down communications.
Fifth, discipline. The US jettisoned regime change in the Soviet Union, realising it was unrealistic and too dangerous in the nuclear age. The west should continue to call for an Iran that acts with restraint towards its people and its neighbours. But all those who seek fundamental change in Iran must also realise the limits of what can be accomplished any time soon. Donald Trump’s threats to attack the regime and encouragement of protesters didn’t just damage his and the US’s credibility, but may have led some Iranians to take risks they should not have. Military force cannot destroy the small units and small arms used against protesters; defending those in the streets is not feasible from afar.
It is never wise for outsiders to promise more than they are able to deliver. But it is feasible to use negotiations and armed force to contain Iran, and to use economic threats and rewards. Together, these can move it towards reform or, possibly, collapse over time, in the process bringing about a better future for the Iranian people and a more stable Middle East.