From invasions and internal revolts to strikes on its leadership, Iran’s theocratic regime has survived for almost half a century through countless crises and foreign interventions.
Repeatedly, and often against the odds, the Islamic Republic showed its ability to adapt under pressure and use ruthless tactics when needed — underscoring the durability of a complex power structure deliberately built on competing centres of influence.
The president, the clerical establishment and the Revolutionary Guard all vie for power under the command of the country’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The result is a system that fragments decision-making yet ultimately reinforces the Ayatollah’s primacy.
Who is the supreme leader and what are his powers?
Khamenei, 86, is in the twilight of his nearly four-decade-long rule. In 1989, he succeeded Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the father of the Islamic Revolution, and has since evolved into a singular figure, one with extraordinary religious authority that extends across most levers of state.
He is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, controls the judiciary and appoints the heads of crucial state bodies including the Guardian Council, a constitutional watchdog dominated by hardliners that vets all candidates for public office.
His personal office has long been accused of operating as Iran’s deep state, coordinating networks of clerics, businessmen and security officials that have grown into a parallel government — one often mired in allegations of state-sponsored corruption.
Khamenei has also this year faced the deadliest and most violent protests since the 1979 revolution. Although the regime eventually contained the unrest this month following a brutal crackdown that killed thousands, it underscored the depth of public anger towards the theocratic system and its leaders.
What has driven Iran’s foreign policy?
Over his decades in power, Khamenei has cultivated a doctrine of “strategic patience”. This combines resistance abroad with managed dissent at home — all to ensure regime survival.
But much of that work has been decimated over the past two years since Hamas launched the October 7 attacks on Israel, sparking a regional war. Iran’s leader emerged with his military advisers and protégés killed and his regional network of proxies severely weakened.
A hardliner who has long opposed diluting the Islamic Republic’s strictures, Khamenei has stubbornly resisted calls for change from within elite leadership circles, analysts said.
In practice it has meant he has overseen a years-long project, aided by the guard, to consolidate hardliners’ control of state institutions.
Hardliners, rooted in conservative clerical circles and closely aligned with the Revolutionary Guard, advocate for tight ideological control and resistance to western influence. They have long viewed reformist ambitions with suspicion or outright hostility.
What happened to the reformists?
Reformists have pushed for incremental change in Iran but within limits. They have sought to loosen cultural restrictions, address economic frustrations and at times have expressed openness to diplomatic engagement with the west.
But over the past decade, the reformist momentum has waned dramatically. Reformists are allowed to participate in politics, but only insofar as they do not threaten the core interests of the clerical establishment or challenge the primacy of the supreme leader and his conservative backers.
President Masoud Pezeshkian, who became the country’s first reformist president in two decades, represents the moderate face of Iran’s political establishment.
A heart surgeon and former health minister, Pezeshkian’s surprise election was greeted by cautious optimism — both among weary Iranian voters and foreign observers who saw in him a possible return to diplomacy.
But he is ultimately a regime loyalist, who has made clear his obedience to Khamenei. In effect, his presidency is a managed concession, a pressure valve intended to placate unrest and not transform the system.
Who are the conservative hardliners?
One archetype is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guard commander and current Speaker of parliament. Once Tehran’s mayor, Ghalibaf embodies the fusion of military discipline and bureaucratic ambition that defines Iran’s conservative elite.
Though often seen as a rival to Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf’s true allegiance is to the preservation of the Islamic Republic’s power structure. He is a pragmatist — willing to work with reformists when useful, but always in service of maintaining regime coherence.
No institution better illustrates the regime’s endurance than the Revolutionary Guard.
Established after the 1979 revolution to protect it from internal and external enemies, the guard has morphed into Iran’s most powerful institution controlling vast sectors of the economy — from construction to alleged smuggling to telecommunications. As well as overseeing Iran’s nuclear programme, the guard exerts decisive influence in foreign policy through its elite Quds Force and the network of allied armed groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
Its leadership, handpicked for loyalty to Khamenei, helps ensure the supreme leader’s authority remains unchallenged.
Could US strikes tip Iran’s balance of power?
Iran’s system was designed not for efficiency but for survival. Power is deliberately fragmented: the president governs under the shadow of the supreme leader; the parliament legislates under the veto of the Guardian Council; the military defers to the Revolutionary Guard, which answers to Khamenei alone.
This web of overlapping institutions ensures that no single figure, not even a reformist president, can dismantle the system from within.
Even if US strikes damage military infrastructure, they are unlikely to diminish the guard’s influence. Historically, the institution has used foreign threats to strengthen its hand, justifying crackdowns and rallying nationalist fervour.
Some analysts argue strikes could actually strengthen the role of the guard, potentially clearing the way for the emergence of a pragmatic strongman willing to discard the Islamist ideology in favour of a new Iranian nationalism.
But the Revolutionary Guard is no monolith and the institution has a long history of internal rivalries. While those have been largely contained under Khamenei, any instability in Iran could bring those feuds into the open.
What about the opposition?
The lack of a unified, credible and structured opposition, after years of repression and exile, left Iran’s protesters isolated. The exiled son of the last shah, Reza Pahlavi, is once again positioning himself as the would-be leader of those pushing for regime change.
Despite some signs his support may be rising, it is partly because desperate Iranians see few other options.
Khamenei’s regime has weathered numerous sanctions, assassinations and uprisings before. Iran’s leaders, divided in vision but united in survival, have repeatedly adapted through resistance.
This time, however, the military assault on the regime may also force difficult choices, pushing the system towards decisions that may change its direction.